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Eradicating the Long Standing Existence of a NoPrecedent Rule in International Trade Law Looking Toward Stare Decisis in WTO Dispute
Settlement
Dana T Blackmore*

I. Introduction
The best way to determine how effectively a legal system
works is to determine how it handles precedent.' It is a common
Anglo-American principle of jurisprudence that like cases should
be decided alike. The principle of stare decisis - of abiding by
previous decisions 2 - is widely practiced by American
communities. However, stare decisis is not exercised in
international law.3 More specifically, the principle of stare decisis
is not exercised in World Trade Organization (WTO)
jurisprudence.

* The author is an associate with the law firm of Handlin & Associates, where she
specializes in insurance defense for the AIG Insurance Company Staff Counsel's Office.
Ms. Blackmore is a graduate of Thurgood Marshall School of Law at Texas Southern
University, Houston, Texas. She is currently a student of the University of Houston Law
Center's LL.M. International Economic Law Program.
I See D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers, Introduction to INTERPRETING
PRECEDENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 1, 1 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers

eds., 1997).
2 Olav A. Haazen, Precedent in the World Court, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 587, 587
(1997) (reviewing MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT
(1996)).
Traditionally, the meaning of stare decisis is that judges are 'obliged to follow
a previous case although they have what would be otherwise good reasons for
not doing so.' Thus, the doctrine can also be stated as the absence of a right to
review the correctness of the legal principles adopted and applied in a
precedent.
Id.
3 See id. at 588 (stating, for example, that "[i]n the World Court, the rule of stare
decisis does not apply," where the World Court refers to the International Court of
Justice).
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The WTO4 embodies one of the most sophisticated
international legal systems in all of international law, due, for the
most part, to its dispute settlement mechanism.5 The WTO
Agreement replaced the 1944 General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT). 6 GATT was intended to operate as a temporary
international trade agreement during the creation and ratification
of the International Trade Organization (ITO); however, the ITO
was never created because of difficulties amongst diverging views
in the United States Congress. 7 As such, GATT continued to serve
as the authority on international trade for more than fifty years
until the WTO was established in 1995 during the final "Uruguay
Round" negotiations of GATT.5
The WTO is not just an extension of GATT, but a complete
replacement of it, embodying procedures for the prompt and
effective settlement of disputes in all policy areas. 9 The Uruguay
Round established dispute settlement procedures for the WTO
known as the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
4

See

JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
MATERIALS, AND TEXT ON THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS: CASES,

ed. 1995) (noting that
"[t]he Uruguay Round results create a new and better defined international organization
and treaty structure - a World Trade Organization (WTO) - to carry forward GATT's
work"); see also Susan Tiefenbrun, Free Trade and Protectionism: The Semiotics of
Seattle, 17 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 257, 267-68 (2000).
The WTO is the principal international agency overseeing and administering the
rules of international trade .... The four primary organs are the Ministerial
Conference, the General Council, the Secretariat, and the Director General ....
Its principal purposes include the development of a durable multilateral trading
system, the reduction of tariffs and barriers to trade, the elimination of
discrimination in trade relations, and the expanded production of trade in goods
and services.
REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 289 (3d

Id.
5 See Raj Bhala, The Power of the Past: Towards De Jure Stare Decisis in WTO
Adjudication (PartThree of a Trilogy), 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 873, 894 (2001).
6 See Sean P. Feeney, The Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO
Agreement: An Inadequate Mechanism for the Resolution of International Trade
Disputes,2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 99, 99 (2002).

7 Id. at 100.
8 See id.
9 INTERNATIONAL

TRADE DATA

SYSTEM,

THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

(WTO) AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES,

available at http://www.itds.treas.

gov/WTO-dispute.htm (last updated Dec. 19, 2002) [hereinafter WTO 2002].
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the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). ° It is believed that the WTO
was instituted to eradicate the troubled system that evolved under
GATT."i
This author believes that GATT's watered-down deterrent
effect is one of the key problems relating to its process of dispute
settlement. GATT dispute settlement operated under a
negotiation/consensus system which did not promote compliance
with GATT rules. 2 This author believes that this problem will
develop within the WTO if it does not institute a system of stare
decisis within its dispute settlement process. If this is not done,
this author strongly believes that the WTO dispute settlement
process will begin to become infected by the history of problems
that plagued the GATT.
Stare decisis means to stand firmly by things that have been
decided - and not to disturb them. 3 In other words, stare decisis
means that a court must decide cases in accordance with
applicable precedent. 4 The doctrine of stare decisis was excluded
from the pre-Uruguay Round GATT dispute settlement system and
continues to be absent from the post-Uruguay Round WTO
system. 15
After providing a historical backdrop of GATT dispute
settlement and an overview of the Dispute Settlement Process, this
article will determine whether stare decisis exists within the WTO.
This article will further provide an understanding of how
differences between the common law and civil law systems of
jurisprudence affect the issue of stare decisis. This article will
then focus on defining stare decisis, determining why a system of
stare decisis is needed in WTO dispute settlement, and, finally,
suggesting how such a system should be instituted within the
WTO. This article will conclude by focusing on the benefits and

10 Id.
11 See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 305.
12 See id. at 332.
13 Russ VERSTEEG, ESSENTIAL LATIN FOR LAWYERS 159 (1990).
14 See

2

SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE,

THE

LAW

AND

PROCEDURE

OF

THE

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 583-84 (1986) (discussing the use of precedent in

International Court of Justice decisions).
15 Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law (Part
One of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 845, 849 (1999).
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draw backs of instituting a system of stare decisis within WTO
dispute settlement and determining the best way to go about
instituting stare decisis within the WTO dispute settlement
process.
II. Historical Backdrop
The DSU is the legal procedure that spells out the rules for
settling disputes within the WTO.16 "The purpose of the WTO
DSU is to provide for an efficient, dependable and rule-oriented
system to resolve, within a multilateral framework, disputes
arising in relation to the application of the Marakesh Agreement
Establishing the WTO."' 7 The DSU has been referred to as the
backbone" of the WTO trading system. 9 Furthermore, the DSU is
the exclusive and ultimate means of enforcing the WTO's trade
regulations.2" This is why this author strongly believes that a
system of stare decisis should be instituted - as a means of
providing more stability in a system that is so important. The
DSU contains twenty-seven articles and is a legally binding
negotiated agreement amongst the various WTO member

16 WORLD

UNDERSTANDING,

TRADE

ORGANIZATION,

REVIEW

OF

THE

DISPUTE

SETTLEMENT

available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min99

_e/english/about e/19dise.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2004) [hereinafter REVIEW].
17 See

WORLD

TRADE

ORGANIZATION,

DISPUTE

SETTLEMENT

MECHANISM:

OVERVIEW: PURPOSE, available at http://www.wto.org/englishlthewto-e/whatise/eol/e

/wto8/wto8_l7.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2004).
18 REVIEW, supra note 16.
19 See Chakravarthi Raghavan, The World Trade Organization and Its Dispute
Settlement System: Tilting the BalanceAgainst the South (Trade and Development Series

No. 9), in THIRD WORLD NETWORK 1 (2000) ("The Dispute Settlement Understanding
(DSU) has been the flagship of the World Trade Organization (WTO), proclaimed as the
most important pillar of the rules-based WTO system ....[T]he supposed benefits of
such an effective dispute settlement system were one of the main persuasive factors for
several developing countries to agree to the Uruguay Round agreements.") (emphasis
added), available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/tilting.htm (last updated Dec. 19,

2003).
20 REVIEW, supra note 16; see also WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, DISPUTES: THE

DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (briefing notes from the Doha WTO Ministerial
Conference 2001) (stating that after six years of operation, WTO members continue to
make extensive use of the WTO dispute settlement system), available at http://www.wto.
org/english/thewtoe/minist e/min0le/brief e/briefl7_e.htm (last visited Jan. 10,

2004).
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governments.

The 1994 Marakesh Ministerial Conference mandated WTO
member governments to conduct a review of the WTO DSU
within four years of its initiation.22 This review was to be based
on how the DSU operated during the period from January 1995 to
July 1999.23 The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) started this
review in late 1997 and many, if not all, members felt that
improvements should be made to the understanding; however, the
DSB could not reach a consensus.24 The Doha Declaration
mandated negotiations with the aim of concluding an agreement.25
III. Overview of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process
The highest level of authority within the WTO is the
Ministerial Conference, which is composed of representatives of
all WTO members. 26 The day-to-day work of the WTO is carried
out by the General Council, which is also composed of all WTO
members.27 The General Council reports to the Ministerial
Conference. The General Council convenes in two forms: 1) as
the DSB to oversee the dispute settlement process; and 2) as the
Trade Policy Review Body. 28 "The DSB is solely authorized to
establish panels, adopt panel and appellate reports, maintain
surveillance of implementation or rulings and recommendations,
and authorize retaliatory measure in cases of non-implementation
of recommendations. 29
"Disputes in the WTO arise when one government accuses
another of violating an agreement or being in breach of its
commitments. 30 The WTO dispute settlement process includes
21 REVIEW, supra note 16.
22 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE DOHA DECLARATION EXPLAINED: DISPUTE

at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/ddae/doha
SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING,
explained e.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2004) [hereinafter DOHA].
23 REVIEW, supra note 16.
24 DOHA, supra note 22.
25 Id.

26 WTO 2002, supra note 9.
27 Id.

28 Id.
29 Id.

30 REVIEW, supra note 16.
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three stages: (1) consultations; (2) the legal stage; and (3)
implementation. 3 This writing deals more with the legal stage of
the process wherein a dispute is examined by an independent panel
of three legal/technical experts.32 Although the panels are
considered to be much like tribunals, unlike tribunals the panelists
are usually chosen in consultation with the countries involved in
the dispute.33 When the countries cannot agree on the composition
of the panelists, the WTO Director General has the authority to
appoint panelists, although the Director General rarely exercises
this power.34 The panelists may be chosen from a permanent list
of candidates or from elsewhere.35 Purportedly, the panelists serve
in their individual capacities and cannot receive instructions from
any government.36 The panel's official responsibility is to assist
the DSB in making rulings and recommendations.37 However,
since the panel's report can only be rejected by a consensus in the
DSB, the panel's rulings and recommendations are difficult to
overturn.38
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism gives the possibility
of appeal to either party in a proceeding. 39 "Appeals are heard by
a standing Appellate Body established by the DSB."4 ° This
Appellate Body is composed of seven persons, which represent a
broad range of the WTO's membership. 4
Members of the
Appellate Body serve four-year terms and must be individuals
who possess a recognized presence in the field of international
trade law.42 In addition, members of the Appellate Body are not
affiliated with any government.4 3 Appeals are said to be based on
31

See id.

32

Id.

33 WTO 2002, supra note 9.
34

Id.

35 Id.
36

Id.

37

Id.
WTO 2002, supra note 9.

38
39
40

ld.
Id.

42

Id.
Id.

43

WTO 2002, supra note 9.

41
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legal points such as legal interpretation because they cannot be
based on the reexamination of existing evidence or the
examination of new evidence. 4 An appeal can uphold, modify, or
reverse the panel's legal findings and conclusions. 45 The only way
that the DSB can reject an Appellate Body report is by
consensus.46

GATT rules apply to trade in goods. 47 The WTO Agreement
applies to trade in goods, trade in services, and trade-related
aspects of intellectual property rights. 4' Dispute decisions of
GATT could not be enforced if a member government chose to
disregard them.49 In contrast, the WTO decisions by the dispute
panels or the appellate body cannot be blocked by a country which
loses its case.5 ° Under GATT, decisions were adopted by
unanimity, whereas a unanimous vote is required to block a
decision of the DSB.51 Where the GATT dispute settlement system
did not include an appellate stage, the WTO dispute settlement
process includes a permanent appellate body to review findings of
the dispute settlement panels.12 "The WTO dispute settlement
process has specific time limits and is faster than the GATT
system."53 It is said to operate more automatically, ensuring less
blockages than the old GATT system. 4
44

Id.

45

Id.
Id.

46

47 WTO vs. GATT: Main Differences, available at http://www.wto.org/english/the
wto_e/whatis_e/eol/e/wtoOl/ wtol_8.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2003) [hereinafter Main
Differences].
48 Id.
49 WTO - Official Ministerial Website - Disputes - What's at Stake?, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/ thewtoe/minist _e/min99_e/English/booke/stak e4.htm
(last visited Feb. 27, 2003).
50 Id.

51 Frieder Roessler et al., Performanceof the System IV: Implementation, 32 INT'L

789 (Fall 1998); see also Bhala, supra note 15, at 867 (noting that pre-Uruguay
Round GATT dispute settlement system panel reports were adopted by a consensus,
while in contrast, under the WTO DSU, panel and Appellate Body reports are adopted
automatically unless there is a consensus against such adoption).
52 Main Differences, supra note 47.
LAW.

53 Id.
54 Id.
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IV. What is Stare Decisis?
Stare decisis originates from medieval England and is believed
to be the "cornerstone" of English common law. 5 Under the
doctrine of stare decisis, "decisions or principles of law that
emerge from a case are binding rule of law in the same court or in
courts of lower rank, where the issue in controversy or the relevant
facts of subsequent cases are substantially similar."56 The United
States Supreme Court, which is the court of last resort in the
United States, can deviate from stare decisis and overrule
precedent, although it must examine its own precedent. A large
portion of the influence of stare decisis is derived from "nature of
the controversy," whether the issue is constitutional, statutory, or
common law.58 For the most part, the Supreme Court will not
overrule a decision concerning the construction or interpretation of
a federal statute due to the fact that Congress has the ability
to
' 59
"alter a statutory court decision and rectify it by legislation."
Two schools of thought exist regarding stare decisis - strict
and liberal.6° Under the strict school of thought, "a court is bound
by both its previous decisions and those of all higher courts,"
unless the facts of the case are different.61 On the other hand,
pursuant to the liberal school of thought, "societal innovations,
legal progressions, and erroneous decision-making" are taken into
account "providing a court with greater flexibility."62
V. The Effect of the Difference Between Common Law and
Civil Law Systems on the Issue of the Existence of Stare
Decisis Within WTO Dispute Settlement
The difference between common law and civil law systems
55 Mei-Fei Kuo & Kai Wang, When Is An Innovation in Order? Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg and Stare Decisis, 20 HAWAII L. REv. 835, 839 (1998).
56 Id. at 839.
57 Id.

58 Id. at 840.
59 Id. (pointing out that the Court, in US. Dep 't of Defense v. Fed.Labor Relations
Auth., 510 U.S. 487 (1994), was reluctant to overrule precedent interpreting a statutory
precedent).
60 Id. at 841.
61 Id.
62 Id.

2004]

STARE DECISIS IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

forms the basis for understanding why the issue of the absence of
stare decisis in the WTO dispute settlement process will probably
never be resolved. It is believed that an "examination of stare
decisis demands
a comparison between common law and civil law
63
systems.,
One of the classic differences between civil law and common
law jurisdictions is that civil law does not recognize judicial
precedent as an independent source of law. 64 "In a common law
system, judicial decisions constitute part of 'the law."' 65 In other
words, "a common law court decides the case and in the process
creates significant law.",66 On the other hand, "a civil code simply
states the law, without justification, explanations, comparisons, or
examples., 67 As will be seen below, a fundamental difference
between the common law and civil law systems regarding
statutory interpretation is that in the civil law system, the statute is
binding, whereas in a common law system, a prior decision
concerning the statute controls. 68 "Because of the absence of stare
decisis in the civil law tradition, judicial decisions interpreting
statutes are not controlling in later cases involving the same
statutes., 69 As such, the civil law community cannot comprehend
how a common law judge can be a source of law without risking
credibility of the system." "The values that promote stare decisis
63 Kuo & Wang, supra note 55, at 870; see also Jonathan R. Macey, Symposium on
Post-Chicago Law and Economics: The Internal and External Costs and Benefits of

Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 93, 96 (1989) (stating that it simply is not possible
to separate a discussion of the value of stare decisis from a discussion of the value of the
common law itself).
64 Thomas Lundmark, Interpreting Precedents: A Comparative Study, 46 AM J.
COMP. L. 211, 214 (1998) (book review).
65 E-mail from Sandford Gaines, Professor of Law, University of Houston School
of Law, to Dana T. Blackmore, LL.M. Candidate, University of Houston School of Law
(July 15, 2003, 4:44:00 CST) (on file with author).
66 Robert Adriaansen, Open Forum: At the Edges of the Law: Civil Law v.
Common Law: A Response to Professor Richard B. Capalli, 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 107, 108 (1998) (indicating that the worth of a common law lawyer is indicated by

her knowledge of how to utilize these authorities and apply them to specific set of facts
and circumstances).

67 Id. at 180.
68 Kuo & Wang, supra note 55, at 872.
69 Id.

70 Adriaansen, supra note 66, at 108 (stating that it is difficult "to explain the civil
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in the common law tradition are the same that repress stare decisis
in the civil law tradition."'" The civil law community erroneously
thinks of precedents as the published case; however, one is better
served by examining the hierarchical structure of both statutory
and case law in understanding stare decisis.72 Civil law systems
are also known as code systems where codes and auxiliary statutes
are the main body of "the law."73 In civil law systems, the courts
apply and interpret the codes and statutes, whereas in common law
systems, the court must follow previous decisions unless there is a
compelling reason not to do so. Judges characterize stare decisis
as a precept for judges to "keep to what has been decided
previously."74
A. Common Law Jurisdictions
The United States and the United Kingdom explicitly follow
precedents.75 Moreover, one of the most distinctive features of the
common law system is the rule of precedent or stare decisis.76 In
this regard, lower courts adhere to a strict doctrine of precedent
(vertical stare decisis) and appellate courts consider their own
precedents to be "defeasible" for good reasons (horizontal stare
decisis) 7 The United Kingdom legal community defends stare
decisis as predictable, efficient, and legitimate.78
"The common law is an enormous body of rules. 79 In a
common law system, some form of stare decisis is a necessary
byproduct of the legal process itself. The doctrine of stare decisis
encompasses common law, as well as constitutional and statutory

law to a common law lawyer or the common law to a civil law lawyer").

71 Kuo & Wang, supra note 55, at 871.
72 Adriaansen, supra note 66, at 108.
73 E-mail from Sandford Gaines, Professor of Law, University of Houston School
of Law, to Dana T. Blackmore, LL.M. Candidate, University of Houston School of Law
(July 15, 2003, 4:44:00 CST) (on file with author).
74 Haazen, supra note 2, at 587.
75 Lundmark, supra note 64, at 212.
76 Haazen, supra note 2, at 587.

77 Lundmark, supra note 64, at 212.
78 Id. at 220.
79 Kuo & Wang, supra note 55, at 839.
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precedent.8"
In common law jurisdictions, stare decisis is
exercised to varying degrees. This exercise is affected by the
different sources of law - constitutional, statutory, and common
law. 8' Precedents interpreting statutes have greater force than
common law precedents, which then have greater force than
precedents interpreting state constitutions.82
As far as the
construction of constitutions are concerned, American courts feel
that the policies and principles served are more important than the
stability provided by precedent, especially in light of the fact that
it is quite difficult to amend the American Constitution.83 In
interpreting statutes, American judges often adhere to a precedent
even if they strongly criticize the result because they believe that it
is the business of the legislature to modify the rule.84 Common
law is thought to "become more concrete and certain as the law
progresses." 85 Furthermore, it has been recognized as a more
"superior system of doing justice"86 than civil law.
B. Civil Law Jurisdictions
The civil law system is governed by statute rather than case
law.87 Civil law judgments do not function as precedents and stare
decisis is said to not exist.88 Nevertheless, proponents of the civil
law system vehemently proclaim that they accord respect and
deference to judicial precedents and the normative power of
precedents is strongly felt whether or not judge-made law is
considered a separate source of law.89 The French do not require
their highest courts to follow their own precedent, but they are said

80 Id.
81 Lundmark, supra note 64, at 213.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.; see also Kuo & Wang, supra note 55, at 861 (noting that "Justice Ginsburg
believes that stare decisis requires the adherence to statutory precedents because 'it's

more than just the soundness of the reasoning.., the reliance interests are important").
85 Adriaansen, supra note 66, at 112.
86 Id. at 113.
87 Kuo & Wang, supra note 55, at 871.
88 Id. at 872.
89 Lundmark, supra note 64, at 215-16.
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to always do so in "practice."9 In Germany, almost all decisions
of the highest appellate courts use citations from previous
opinions. 9 A forty-six year study revealed that, of the 4,000
German Federal Constitutional Court cases, it departed form
precedent in fewer than twelve cases.92 After the fall of
communism, Polish judges and lawyers cited judicial decisions on
a wide scale and applicants for the bar and judicial office are often
tested on precedents as well as on statutory law.93 The Supreme
Court of Finland seeks through its judicial opinions to guide the
application of the law by the lower courts, while the lower courts
are not legally bound to follow the Finnish Supreme Court's
decisions.94
As such, it is clear that to varying degrees, the idea of
precedents and stare decisis is favored by both common law and
civil law systems of jurisprudence. Furthermore, recent studies
reveal that judicial decisions are beginning to play as important a
role in civil law systems as in they do in common law systems.95
C. InternationalLaw Jurisdictions
Some scholars believe that international law, and more
specifically, the WTO dispute settlement process, is more similar
to the civil law system. However, other scholars believe that
international law is neither civil law nor common law, and the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), commonly referred to as the
"World Court," cannot be said to stand distinctly in either one or
the other.96 Whether international law complies more with the
civil law system or not, all will agree that the rule of stare decisis
does not apply to international law.97 In other words, "decisions of

90 Id. at 215.
91

Id.

92 Id.

93 Id.
94

Id.

95 See, e.g., Kuo & Wang, supra note 55, at 872 n.3 10.
96

Haazen, supra note 2, at 587.

97 Id. at 588 (noting that Shahabuddeen harmonizes positions on the matter by
stating that stare decisis does not apply in the International Court of Justice, yet "subject
to a power to depart, decisions of the Court may be regarded as authoritative").
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international tribunals are not a direct source of law." 98 The ICJ is
considered to be the "principal judicial organ" of the United
Nations. Article 59 of the ICJ Statute states that "a decision of the
ICJ has no binding force except between the parties and in respect
of the particular case." 99

Article 59 further states that "in a

subsequent case involving different parties but involving the same
or a similar issue, a prior holding is not binding.""1 ° Article 59 also
states that "even if one of the parties is involved in a subsequent
case in which the same or a similar issue arises, a prior holding has
no binding force."10 1 In addition, Article 38.1(d) of the ICJ
Statute, which refers to decisions of tribunals other than the ICJ,
expressly admonishes the use of judicial opinions as a binding
precedent.10 2 It is believed that stare decisis does not exist within
the ICJ because the binding force of precedent depends on the
hierarchy of courts - where there is no hierarchy, no such binding
force exists.'13 In this regard, it is thought that "higher courts bind
lower courts and courts of co-ordinate authority do not bind each
other."'0 4 Therefore, since there is only one World Court, there is
no hierarchy and, as such, no binding precedent.10 5 The doctrine
of stare decisis is also thought to relate to the question of whether
98 Haazen, supra note 2, at 597 (citing OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 41
(Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992).

99 Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law, 14 AM
U. INT'L L. REv. 845, 863 (1999) (citing the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055 at 1062, 3 Bevans 1179 at 1190); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 903 cmt. g (1987).
100 Bhala, supra note 99, at 863.
101 Id.
102 MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT

63 (1996).

103 Haazen, supra note 2, at 589.
104

Id.

[T]he House of Lords decided in 1898 that it was bound by its own decisions,
but abandoned this rule in 1966. The English Court of Appeal has also
considered itself bound by its own decisions, but the reason that the court of
appeal may do this is not because it has so decided. That would require some
prior binding force for that decision. Instead, it grounded its position on
authorities from the House of Lords. Therefore, the basis of the Court of
Appeal being bound by its decisions lies in hierarchy and the existence of a
higher court, not simply in its own precedents.
Id.
105 Id.
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the highest court, or the sole court, in a legal system can bind
itself.1"6 If there is no lower international courts upon which the
ICJ's decisions could have binding force, then the ICJ's own
decisions are not binding upon the ICJ. 7 Some scholars believe
that such a horizontal "precedential effect" is illogical because it is
difficult to decide to be bound by its own decisions in future
cases.108
In order to be binding, the decision requires a
presupposition on the part of the organization to be bound that the
decision is binding.10 9 Otherwise, "it could be freely withdrawn or
overruled with the result that the court is not truly bound."" 0
Therefore, it follows that "the rule of precedent cannot be the
source of its own authority."''
Proponents of this line of thinking
go so far as to point out that even the highest common law courts
reserve the right to depart from their previous decisions." 2 With
all of this said, the ICJ's case law is relatively characterized as
"authoritative" and having "precedential effect.""' 3
In addition, section 102 of the Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States indicates that there is
no stare decisis within the international body of law." 4
Furthermore, that section also states the following: "International
law arises from two primary sources - custom and international

106

Id.

107

Id.

108 Hazen, supra note 2, at 590.

109 Id.
110 Id.

I1I Id.
112

Id.

113 Id.

[U]nder Article 38, paragraph l(d) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, the Court must at least take account of any relevant judicial
decision ....
[T]he Court has a strong tendency to adhere closely to its
previous holdings. As a practical matter, it follows its own case law, advisory
opinions and decisions, as well as those of its predecessor, the Permanent Court
of International Justice. Even if the Court's decisions are not binding, they are
precedents, nonetheless .... [T]hat is not to say that the ICJ... has ... a rule
of precedent, for it does not.
Id. (citations omitted).
114 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 102(1), cmt. 1 (1987).
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agreement, and one secondary source, general legal principles
common to the world's major legal systems.""' 5 This is yet
another indication of the absence of stare decisis because stare
decisis does not emanate from any of these sources.
VI. Does Stare Decisis Exist Within the WTO Dispute
Settlement Process?
To international law practitioners, it is a common
understanding that stare decisis does not exist within WTO
dispute settlement. Stare decisis certainly did not exist within the
GATT dispute settlement system." 6 Furthermore, based on the
aforementioned long-standing tradition of a rule of no-precedent in
international law, it naturally follows that stare decisis would be
absent from the WTO dispute settlement process. As a result of
the influence of accepted doctrines of international law, stare
decisis does not apply to decisions of WTO panels which are not,
therefore, binding in future disputes."' The stare decisis effect on
the interpretation of a multilateral treaty is intriguing due to the
fact that some member states may operate under civil law systems
while others may operate under a common law system.'18
On one hand, some scholars believe in the existence of a "de
facto" (rather than a "de jure") doctrine of stare decisis." 9 The

doctrine of de facto stare decisis suggests that a court or body
decides future disputes pursuant to the law of past binding
decisions, but in name only. In other words, there is no mandate
to do so. Therefore, sometimes the decision-making body could
adhere to the doctrine, but it would not have to adhere always to
the doctrine. De jure stare decisis suggests that a body must
115 Id.

116 Bhala, supra note 99, at 870 (noting that GATT dispute settlement has always
been viewed as fundamentally a matter between the governments, parties to the dispute.
The rulings and conclusions set out in a panel report are considered to apply only to the
matter at issue and to the parties involved in the particular case. In prior GATT practice,
there was no concept of stare decisis - panel reports have not been viewed, strictly
speaking, as legal precedents).
117 Arun Venkataraman, BinationalPanels and MultilateralNegotiations: A TwoTrack Approach to Limiting Contingent Protection, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 533,

599 (1999).
118 Louis F. Del Duca, 81 AM. J. INT'LL. 465,466 (1987) (book review).
119 Bhala, supra note 99, at 849-50.
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decisions unless it
decide current cases pursuant to its past
120
overrules itself and makes new precedent.
Then there is the paradox between what is called "persuasive
yet non-binding precedent" and "precedent". Professors John
Jackson and Davey have concluded that the new DSU does not
contain anything that would lead to a view that the legal effect of
panel reports is any different from that of the practice of the preUruguay Round era under GATT.121 This suggests that a stare
decisis effect of panel reports does not exists, although the panel
However, persuasive is not
report remains "persuasive."
dispositive or forceful. 122 But whether called "persuasive yet nonbinding precedent" or just plain "precedent," precedent by its very
nature is binding. 23 Precedent means binding decisions of higher
jurisdiction as well as decisions of the same
courts of the same
124
appellate court.

Some scholars suggest that there is a movement in
international dispute resolution away from the "old-fashioned,
continental style" towards the Americanized adjudicatory
it is believed that WTO decisions have
approach.125 For example,
"a binding nature."' 26 Currently, however, the rulings and
conclusions set out in panel reports apply only to the dispute at27
issue and to the parties involved in the particular dispute.
Despite the fact that panels have regularly referred to, and
followed, prior panel reports,' 28 distinguishing between de facto
120

Id.

Id. at 872 (citing JOHN H. JACKSON
ECONOMIC RELATIONS (3d ed. 1995)).
122 Id. at 873.
121

123

ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL

Id. at 875.

124 Id. at 920 (quoting D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers, Precedent in the
United States (New York State), in INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS 355, 364 (D. Neil
MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1997)).
125 Id. at 845, 847.
126

Debra P. Steger, WTO Dispute Settlement, in THE WTO
53, 53 (Philip Ruttley et al. eds., 1998).
Id.

AND INTERNATIONAL

TRADE REGULATION
127

128 Arun Venkataraman, Note, BinationalPanels and MultilateralNegotiations: A
Two-Track Approach to Limiting Contingent Protection, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
533, 599 (1999) (pointing out that WTO panels frequently consider the decisions of past
GATT and WTO panels and that such practice has been encouraged by the WTO).
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and de jure stare decisis and non-binding precedent and precedent
is quite frustrating. 29 In the opinion of this author, a system of de
facto stare decisis is not stare decisis at all. So, does the doctrine
of stare decisis exist within WTO adjudication? Clearly, the
answer is no. More specifically, Article 3.2 of the DSU and
Article IX.2 of the WTO Agreement infer that GATT panel
reports, WTO panel reports, and Appellate Body reports are not to
be used as formal sources of law for subsequent disputes. 3 °
Furthermore, Article XVI. 1 of the WTO Agreement provides that
the WTO "shall be guided by the decisions, procedures and
customary practices followed by GATT in the pre-Uruguay Round
era." It has already been established that stare decisis did not exist
within the pre-Uruguay Round Agreement GATT dispute
settlement system. 131 As such, the non-existence of stare decisis in
international trade law is thought to be virtually "black letter
law."' 32 It is also believed that the lack of stare decisis within the
WTO dispute settlement system was simply inherited from the ICJ
by the drafters of 33the International Trade Organization (ITO)
Charter and GATT.1
VII. The Problem: Is There Need for a System of Binding
Precedent/Stare Decisis Within the WTO Dispute
Settlement Process?
A. Pros
The doctrine of stare decisis takes its name from the Latin
129

Bhala, supra note 15, at 875-76.

130 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: UNDERSTANDING

ON RULES AND PROCEDURES

(Annex 2 to the WTO Agreement), Apr. 15,
1994, art. 3.2 [hereinafter the DSU] (stating that "[r]ecommendations and rulings of the
DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered
agreements"); see also Uruguay Round Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, April 15, 1994, art. IX, sec. 2, 33 I.L.M. 1144 [hereinafter WTO
Agreement] (stating that the Ministerial Conference and General Council are the
exclusive organs for rendering a definitive interpretation of a provision of GATT or a
Uruguay Round Agreement and establishing that panels and the Appellate Body are
empowered to decide matters only for the parties in front of them, not to render
interpretations of disputed textual provisions for other WTO members).
131 WTO Agreement, supra note 130, art. XVI, sec. 1.
GOVERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

132 Bhala, supra note 15, at 885.
133 Id. at 885-86.
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phrase "stare decisis et non quieta movere," which means to
"stand by the thing decided and do not disturb the calm."' 34 As
stated above, stare decisis represents the general proposition that a
precedent must be followed unless there is a cogent reason to
overrule it.'35 "Precedent is defined as courts deciding cases on
the basis of principles established in prior cases."' 3 6 A judicial
system's collection of precedents is viewed as its principal asset.' 37
As stated above, stare decisis is the hallmark of the American
common law system. 3 ' Surely that does not mean that it should
be the hallmark of WTO dispute settlement. But such a system is
thought to foster stability and certainty.' 39 Justice Harlan made the
following comments regarding stare decisis:
Very weighty considerations underlie the principle that courts
should not lightly overrule past decisions. Among these are (1)
the desirability that the law furnish a clear guide for the conduct
of individuals, to enable them to plan their affairs with assurance
against untoward surprise; (2) the importance of furthering fair
and expeditious adjudication by eliminating the need to relitigate every relevant proposition in every case; and (3) the
necessity of maintaining public faith in14the
judiciary as a source
0
of impersonal and reasoned judgments.
"Stare decisis is preferred because it offers evenhanded,
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters
reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and

134 See Amy L. Padden, Overruling Decisions in the Supreme Court: The Role of a
Decision's Vote, Age, and Subject Matter in the Application of Stare Decisis After Payne

v. Tennessee, 82 GEO. L.J. 1689 (1994) (quoting James C. Rehnquist, The Power That
Shall Be Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis, the Constitution and the Supreme Court,
66 B.U. L. REV. 345, 347 (1986)).
135 Id.; see also Ronald Kahn, The Supreme Court as a (Counter) Majoritarian
Institution: Misperceptions of the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts, 1994 DET.
C.L. REV. 1 (1994).
136 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1176 (6th ed. 1990).
137 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical
and EmpiricalAnalysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 250 (1976).
138 See Padden, supra note 134, at 1689.

139 See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1986) (stating that adherence to
the doctrine of stare decisis promotes stability, predictability, and respect for judicial
authority).
140 Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970).
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perceived integrity of the judicial process.''

Stare decisis is

thought to be predictable and consistent because it ensures that
"the law will not merely change erratically" and permits society to
rest assured that "bedrock principles are founded in the law rather
than in the proclivities of individuals., 142 "Public confidence in
the judicial process, administrative efficiency, and the nature of
the controversy at issue also encourage the following of
precedent."'14 It is believed that "society's substantial reliance
upon a fundamental principle within a decision is one of the most
for stare decisis. ' 144
invoked justifications
frequently
Furthermore, it is believed that "a court can promote stability and
45
certainty in the law by abiding by an established precedent.'
Additionally, adhering to a rule of stare decisis improves society's
ability to plan and avoid the results of the unknown by providing a
structured and consistent body of law.' 46
Stare decisis also is thought to stand for equality, efficiency,
and the appearance of justice. 47 This concept also will foster
retention of public confidence in the legitimacy of a court and
permit a court to better serve the public because stare decisis
facilitates a court's ability to function effectively as the ultimate
arbitrator of the law in its community. 48 Some commentators
believe that through the application of stare decisis, a court
becomes more effective in earning the respect of the community
and generating community adherence to the law. 14 Alexander
141See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1990); see also Kuo & Wang, supra
note 55, at 850 (indicating that "stare decisis promotes systematic consistency by
insuring unity across the related areas of law and consensus among the government
entities," and "[C]ourts also promote stability and certainty in the law by overruling
decisions that are erroneously reasoned or contain an inconsistent constitutional or
statutory interpretation.").

142 See Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 265.
143 Kuo & Wang, supra note 55, at 844.
144 Jd. at 845.

145 Id.
146 Id.

147 Padden, supra note 134, at 1689.
148 Kuo & Wang, supra note 55, at 849.
149 Id. (stating that "the public's ability to adhere to the law is enhanced when a
court applies stare decisis because the public's planning of activities and resolution of
disputes will be easier and more reliable).
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Hamilton, in The Federalist, referred to stare decisis as a "vital
component of preserving a jurisprudential system that is not based
upon arbitrary discretion." 50 Moreover, in the more recent case of
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter stated that "stare decisis
is of fundamental importance to the rule of law because of its selfgoverning nature."' 51 Furthermore, "staredecisis is thought to be
efficient because it minimizes error costs within the judicial
system, it maximizes the public-good aspect of judicial decisionmaking, and it minimizes the costs of judicial review. '
Another advantage of stare decisis is that it provides a basis
for judicial decision-making when judges do not know the correct
answer. "' "Stare decisis enables judges to leverage a single skill the ability to tell when like cases are alike - into a facility for
deciding a wide variety of cases that involve substantive legal
issues about which the judges may know next to nothing."'' 54 In
this regard, stare decisis allows judges to share information among
one another, enabling them to develop areas of comparative
advantage.' 55 In addition, stare decisis enables decision-makers to
reduce the uncertainty associated with making decisions because
they can compare their analyses with analyses of similar decisionmakers.' 56 This can be useful in the WTO dispute settlement
system because different individuals make up the panels that are
chosen for each dispute. This allows decision-makers to conserve
resources.'57 It is inefficient for courts to reinvent the wheel for
every issue presented. Thus, stare decisis helps courts to dispose
150 Id. at 839 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)).
151 Id.

152 Jonathan R. Macey, The Internal and External Costs and Benefits of Stare
Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 93, 93-94 (1989).
153 Id. at 95.
154 Id.
155 Id.

156 Id.at 102.

157 Id.at 103; see also Kuo & Wang, supra note 55, at 849 (pointing out that stare
decisis promotes administrative efficiency and judicial restraint and noting that Justice
Cardozo explained, "[t]he labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking
point if every past decision could be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one's
own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had
gone before him").
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of cases and to focus their attention on new and unresolved
issues."' Furthermore, stare decisis restrains judges from infusing
their own values into their construction and interpretation of the
9
law.

15

It is true that stare decisis is a compromise between the past
and the future and reflects the tension between change and
stability. 6 ' Some commentators believe that the "doctrine of stare
decisis reflects the fundamental values of the legal process and the
' 61
tension within the common law between change and stability."'
But in this regard, "change and predictability" do not have to be
mutually exclusive. 162 Change and predictability can exist in the
same atmosphere at the same time. 163 The most desirable legal
systems are those that offer credible promises to the community
64
and respond to new information and changing conditions.
While stare decisis is a mandatory rule within American
jurisprudence, courts
have recognized their power to overrule a
65
prior decision. 1
The strict rule of stare decisis provides society with a
comprehensive behavioral guide and a feeling of equality by
applying the same principles of law to factually similar
situations. 66 However, the liberal rule of stare decisis is more
effective in fostering a useful system of rules that addresses
changes in society and accommodates the public's values and
158 Kuo & Wang, supra note 55, at 849.
159 Id.

160 See Religious Liberty and the Bill of Rights: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 1st Sess. 58-59
(1995) (including testimony of Professor Michael S. Paulsen of the University of
Minnesota Law School stating that a court should not blindly follow an iniquitous
decision instead of correcting it because this can lead to more damage to the justice
system than overruling the decision would bring about stability); see also Macey, supra
note 152, at 93.
161 Macey, supra note 152, at 93.
162 Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the IncorporationPuzzle, 1
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225,280 (1985).
163 Id. at 281.

164 Id. at 280.
165 Todd E. Freed, Comment, Is Stare Decisis Still the Lighthouse Beacon of
Supreme CourtJurisprudence?:A CriticalAnalysis, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1767, 1770 (1996).
166 Kuo & Wang, supra note 55, at 841.
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needs. 67
'
Some believe that the dispute settlement system under the
WTO could operate in a more effective and efficient manner if it
included the doctrine of stare decisis.6 8 Some commentators
believe that such a practice fosters "the development of certain
legal principles that consistently applied across disputes so as to
constitute a 'practice' that can guide future panels and, as such,
ensure even greater consistency in the interpretation of a treaty."169
Furthermore, others believe that other than the WTO Agreements,
there is no source of law that is more important than WTO dispute
settlement decisions of prior dispute settlement panels including
Appellate Body reports.17 ° No matter how similar a present
dispute is to a prior dispute, the current WTO panel's holding and
recommendations can be exactly opposite of the prior holdings
and recommendations of a similar dispute. 171
The absence of stare decisis greatly dilutes any "deterrent
effect" on WTO members from engaging in similar unsavory
tactics and conduct. 172 Stare decisis will ensure that parties and
non-parties know the legal reach of a panel or Appellate Body
Report. 73
'
Also related to the problem of the lack of stare decisis in WTO
dispute settlement is the question of enforcement. 174 "It is said that
the WTO's dispute settlement process underscores the rule of law,
167 Id. (stating further that the "liberal rule enables government to overrule obsolete
precedent so that the law can account for societal advances, such as technological
innovations, the changing role of women in our society, and the presence of greater
international relations").
168 Feeney, supra note 6, at 112.
169 Venkataraman, supra note 128, at 599. "Decisions under the DSU have sought
to establish consistency in their interpretation of WTO rules, despite the absence of stare
decisis." Id. at 600.
170 David Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO System: Sources of Law, 92
AM. J. INT'L L. 398, 400 (1998).
171 Feeney, supra note 6, at 107. See also infra pp. 26-27 and notes 198-216.
172 Id.

173 Bhala, supra note 15, at 869 (noting that "whether WTO panel and Appellate
body decisions are respected, not only by the parties to a given dispute but by other
states considering comparable trade measures, is a gauge by which to measure the
commitment of WTO members to a more secure, predictable dispute resolution
system").
174 Feeney, supra note 6, at 108.
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and it makes the trading system more secure and predictable."'' 75
But is this idea really true? 176 Although the DSB has the power to
authorize retaliation when a country does not comply with a
ruling, 177 a country does not have to comply with a WTO DSU
decision if it would be worse off complying than not complying
and accepting the sanctions. 178 In a system without stare decisis,
adjudicatory decisions cannot guarantee consistency. 79 Stare
decisis can be a guarantee of something more than mere
arbitration. 8 ° Some scholars believe that the watered down
interpretations of DSU panels have enhanced the obligations of the
developing countries while enhancing the rights of the developed
countries.' 8 ' A system of stare decisis would reduce first world third world tension.'82 In other words, stare decisis would reduce
the probability that developed countries would use their political
and economic power to sway the outcome of a dispute.'83
It is said that legal rules of courts have two types of economic
effects: (1) external to the litigants themselves in the form of the
information content of the decision, which provide valuable
indicators to future litigants; and (2) actual wealth transfers
associated with a particular decision, which are internalized by the
parties themselves.' 84 Stare decisis has the tendency to maximize
the external economic effects of a particular decision and
175 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Dispute Settlement Procedures (Dec. 19, 2002),
available at http://www.itds.treas.gov/WTO-dispute.htm

[hereinafter WORLD TRADE

ORGANIZATION].

176 See Chakravarthi Raghavan, The World Trade Organization and its Dispute

Settlement System: Tilting the Balance Against the South (Trade and Development Series
No. 9), The World Network, available at http://www.twnside.org. (last visited on Feb.
27, 2003) (stating that although the DSU has brought about some degree of predictability
and efficiency in the resolution of disputes, the utility of the system in actual operation
has fallen short of the initial expectations and euphoria).
177 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 175.

178 Feeney, supra note 6, at 108.

179 Bhala, supra note 5, at 909.
180

Id.

181 See Raghavan, supra note 176.
182 Bhala, supra note 5, at 907.
183 Id.

184 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 235, 236 (1979).
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minimize the internal effects.'85 In this regard, stare decisis would
level the playing field for developing countries because
developing countries would know that developed countries would
be bound as a matter of international law by prior holdings.' 86
Instituting a rule of stare decisis in the WTO dispute
settlement process would provide parties and non-parties with an
187
indicator of the legal reach of panel or Appellate Body reports.
As such, WTO panel and Appellate Body determinations will be
respected by the parties to a given dispute and, further, will be
more likely to be respected by other states.' 88 This will provide for
a more secure, predictable dispute resolution system.' 89 It is
believed that Members would take the WTO more seriously if
panels followed their prior decisions.' 90 Moreover, stare decisis
assures predictability, which translates into security and
consistency for the multilateral trading system.'9'
Lastly, in a system where stare decisis does not operate, the
importance of legal decisions is diminished and can be even
negligible.' 92
B. Cons
"Shakespeare was concerned about the mischief that might be
done in the name of judicial precedent."' 93 Further, Jonathan Swift
assails the legal system for taking special care to record all the
decisions formerly made against common justice and the general
reason of mankind and producing these under the name of
precedents ... as authorities to justify the most iniquitous
opinions."' 94 This author believes that the pros far outweigh the
cons as there are many more reasons to institute a system of stare
decisis than not.
185 Macey, supranote 152, at 106.
186 Bhala, supra note 5, at 907.
187 Steger, supra note 126, at 53.
188 Id.at 53.
189 Id.at 57.
190 Id.
191 Bhala, supranote 15, at 916.
192 Id. at 926.

193 Freed, supra note 165, at 1767.
194 Id.

2004]

STARE DECISIS IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

C. Case Studies
1. India's Pharmaceuticaland AgriculturalChemical
ProductsPatent Procedures
The stare decisis issue was raised in the 1998 WTO case
dealing with a complaint by the European Community and its
member states (EU) regarding the absence in India of patent
protections for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemicals that
provide for the grant of exclusive marketing rights for such
products.195 In this case, the EU argued that the measure at issue
had already been examined by the panel and the Appellate Body in
an earlier dispute (WT/DS50) in which the EU was a third party.' 96
The EU requested that the panel extend its previous decision to the
current decision. The United States recently had brought a similar
complaint regarding India's Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
chemical products patent procedures.1 97 India believed that the
panel should have dismissed the EU's complaint, because the EU
should have brought its complaint simultaneously with the United
States.198 India argued that successive complaints by different
Members on the same matter would have to be examined as
separate new cases, which would result in the danger of
contradictory decisions and waste of resources. 99 India argued
that res judicata did not apply since the parties were different and
stare decisis did not apply in the WTO to the interpretations of a
panel or the Appellate Body.2"' India argued further that the
principle of stare decisis also did not prevent multiple complaints
on the same matter because this principle had not been applied in
GATT/WTO jurisprudence.0 ' India cited the 1989 GATT Panel
on EEC - Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples (Complaint
by Chile) which noted that a previous panel in 1980 reported on a
195 World Trade Organization, India-PatentProtection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Products, Complaint by the European Communities and their Member
States WT/DS79/R (1998), availableat 1998 WTO DS LEXIS, at *3.
196 Id. at *22.
197

Id. at *23.

198 Id. at *25.
199 Id.at

*26.

200

Id. at *28.

201

Id. at *29.

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

[Vol. 29

complaint involving a similar set of GATT issues but that it "did
not feel it was legally bound by all the details and legal reasoning
of the 1980 Panel Report. 2 °2 India noted that the issue of the
binding nature of panel decisions had arisen in WTO dispute
settlement for the first time in the Complaint on Japan - Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages and that panel concluded that panel reports
adopted by the GATT contracting parties and the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body constitute subsequent practice in a specific case
by virtue of the decision to adopt them. However, the Appellate
Body reversed this finding and pointed out that Article IX:2 of the
WTO Agreement provided that "the Ministerial Conference and
the General Council shall have the exclusive authority to adopt
interpretations of the WTO Agreement and of the Multilateral
Trade Agreements." The Appellate Body held that this clause
provided the only possibility to adopt definitive interpretations.2 3
Because of the EU's request that a prior panel decision be
extended to the current matter, the panel thought it necessary to
determine "whether, and if so, to what extent it was bound by the
reports of Panels and the Appellate Body regarding the same
subject matter in the dispute between the United States and
India., 20 4 The panel noted that a number of GATT panels had

examined complaints by different contracting parties involving the
same or similar measures of a responding party. 2 5 The panel
noted, however, that the issue of whether adopted panel reports are
stare decisis, had not been directly addressed in any of those
cases. 20 6 The panel noted that "the following passage from the
second Tuna report is the only instance where a discussion of stare
decisis occurs in GATT panel reports":
In the view of the EEC and the Netherlands, the United States
interpretation of the term 'necessary' as meaning 'needed'
Id.
India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products,
Complaint by the European Communities and Their Member States, WT/DS79/R; (983091), 1998 WTO DS LEXIS, at *3 (stating further that the fact that such an "'exclusive
authority' in interpreting the treaty has been established so specifically in the WTO
Agreement is reason enough to conclude that such authority does not exist by
implication or by inadvertence elsewhere").
204 Id. at *168-69.
202
203

205

Id. at * 169.

206 Id. at *171.
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amounted to a rejection of adopted panel reports, which
constituted agreed interpretations of the General Agreement.
The EEC recognized that there was no stare decisis in the
GATT, if only because there was no hierarchy between courts or
arbitral bodies in the GATT. This was also the case for most
international courts or tribunals.
Nevertheless, such
international courts and tribunals were always very careful about
maintaining their own precedents and a certain coherence in
their decisions. The GATT required such coherence in panel
interpretations in order to provide stability within the
international trading system.2 °7
The panel then noted that the Appellate Body discussed the
effect of adopted panel reports in its report on the Japan - Liquor
case as follows:
Adopted panel reports are an important part of the GATT
acquis. They are often considered by subsequent panels. They
create legitimate expectations among WTO Members, and
therefore, should be taken into account where they are relevant
to any dispute. However, they are not binding, except with
respect to resolving the particular dispute between the parties to
that dispute.2 °8
"The Panel concluded that panels are not bound by previous
decisions of panels or the Appellate Body even if the subjectmatter is the same., 219 "In examining dispute WT/DS79 the Panel
held that it was not legally bound by the conclusions of the Panel
in dispute WT/DS50 as modified by the Appellate Body report."2 '
The panel stated further, however, that in the course of normal
dispute settlement procedure required under Article 10.4 of the
DSU, it would take into account the conclusions and reasoning 211
in
the panel and Appellate Body reports in WT/DS50.
Furthermore, the panel held that in its examination, it believed that
it should give significant weight to both Article 3.2 of the DSU,
which stresses the role of the WTO dispute settlement system in
providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading
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Id. at "171-72.
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Id. at* 173.
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Id.
Id.

209
210
211

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

[Vol. 29

system, and the need to avoid inconsistent rulings.212 As such, the
panel held that in its view, these considerations form the basis of
the requirement of the referral to the213 original panel wherever
possible under Article 10.4 of the DSU.
Therefore, the panel denied India's request to dismiss the EU's
complaint. However, the panel did not state that it would "extend"
its prior ruling to the current matter. Nevertheless, the panel held
that it would refer to the prior ruling.
2. Guatemala'sAnti-Dumping Measures on Grey Portland
Cementfrom Mexico
The issue of whether a previous panel report constituted
precedent was raised by way of a third-party argument of Ecuador
in the case of Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on
Grey Portland Cement from Mexico.214 In light of the ruling of the
Appellate Body in WT/DS60/AB/R, and taking into account the
fact that the present dispute was brought by Mexico essentially to
resolve the substance of a case that was not resolved by the WTO
panel in Guatemala I, Ecuador argued that the conclusions,
recommendations, and suggestion of the panel in Guatemala
WT/DS60/R do not constitute a legal precedent under
GATT/WTO practice, and should not be taken into consideration
as such.215 Ecuador asserted that "in international law, it is
acceptable for decisions of international bodies adopted in excess
of their jurisdiction to be considered void and without legal
effect., 216 An example of such an occurrence took place in the
case of Guatemala I. Ecuador believed that Mexico's suggestion
that the panel rely on various precedents of fact and law from the
previous procedure is inadmissible and should not be accepted.217
Therefore, Ecuador felt that Guatemala's request that the panel
issue a preliminary decision declaring that it would not take into

212

Id. at *176.

213 Id.
214 WT/DS156/R; (00-4282), 2000 WTO DS LEXIS, at *34 (2000) [hereinafter
Guatemala].
215 Id. at *98-99.
216 Id.
217 Id.
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account the report in GuatemalaI was relevant.218
Mexico requested that the panel endorse the work and the
conclusions of the panel in the first dispute (hereinafter Guatemala
1) and therefore repeatedly quotes the latter's report. 219 The panel
stated that "according to Article 11 of the DSU, however, it must
respect its obligation to make an objective assessment of the
matter and conduct its own review, completely disregarding the
'
report published by the previous Panel."22
"In Guatemala I, the
Appellate Body ruled that the Panel which examined the dispute
should never have considered the claims submitted to it and
rejected its report.1

21

The panel held that, "as a result, this report

222
has no value as a precedent, as evidence or as guidance.
Honduras considered that, "if this Panel was guided by the
reasoning in the report in the Guatemala I case, this would
constitute a precedent that would have a negative impact on every
WTO Member. '223 Honduras felt that "the report published in the
Guatemala I case could not even be used simply for guidance, 224
as
has sometimes occurred for reports that were not adopted.,
Honduras argued that "there is a substantive difference between a
report that was not adopted by the DSB - whose legal findings
have not been rejected - and a report expressly rejected by the
Appellate Body; it is clear that a report that has been rejected has
no legal existence. ' 2 25 Honduras therefore supported Guatemala's
request that a preliminary decision be taken declaring that the
panel should
not take into account the report on the Guatemala I
6

case.

22

The panel considered Guatemala's request that it not take into
account its decisions in the report of the panel in Guatemala Cement .227 Guatemala argued that the report of the panel in
218

Id. at *99.
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Guatemala - Cement I had no legal status and could not constitute
a valid precedent because the Appellate Body concluded that the
panel did not have the mandate to examine the complaints before
it.2 28 Thus, Guatemala was of the view that recourse to the report
issued in Guatemala - Cement I was useful guidance in respect of
any matter being examined in the present dispute would be a
violation of the decision of the Appellate Body. 29 Guatemala
equated the value of the previous panel report to that of an
unadopted panel report. 230 Guatemala argued that the previous
panel lacked the mandate to review the case. 231 Thus, its opinion
on this matter has no legal value as precedent or guidance.232
Mexico believed that:
(a) the arguments presented by it in the present dispute were put
before the Panel independently of their having been supported,
or not, by a previous panel; (b) the panel report in GuatemalaCement I is an adopted panel report; (c) the panel report in
Guatemala - Cement I was an integral part of the request for
establishment of this Panel and as such is part of its mandate;
and (d) assuming arguendo that the panel report in GuatemalaCement I was not adopted, it nevertheless contains useful
guidance pertinent to the issues before US.233
The panel noted "that the Appellate Body ruled in Guatemala Cement I that the dispute was not properly before the Panel, and
that it therefore could not consider any of the substantive issues
raised in the alternative by Guatemala., 234 "In other words, the
Appellate Body found that the panel in Guatemala - Cement I
should never have reached the substance of the dispute. 235 The
panel, therefore, held "that the substantive findings of the panel in
Guatemala - Cement I were in this respect similar to those of
unadopted panel reports, i.e., while they have no legal status, they
may nevertheless provide useful guidance to the extent that we
228
229

230

Id.
Id.
Id.

232

Id.
Id.

233

Id. at *408.

234

Id.

231

235 Id.
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The panel noted
consider them relevant and persuasive.
Mexico's assertion that its arguments in this dispute were before
the panel independently of their having been supported, or not, by
a previous panel. 2 "
VIII. How to Institute Stare Decisis in the WTO Dispute
Settlement Process
The DSB grapples seriously with separation of powers. As
pointed out previously, the General Council reports to the
Ministerial Conference. Therefore, it becomes problematic for the
DSB, which is an arm of the General Council to interpret the
General Agreement. But stare decisis does not apply to the
Agreements of the WTO Members; it applies to the rules
governing dispute settlement adjudication. The separation of
powers issue can be easily alleviated by instituting rules within the
DSU governing stare decisis. In the American common law
system of stare decisis there is a line of demarcation between
common law and statutory analysis. As such, courts treat stare
decisis regarding constitutional law differently than it treats stare
decisis regarding statutory law. This author suggests a somewhat
similar proposition regarding a system of WTO stare decisis but
not as great. In this regard, there should be a clear line of
demarcation between issues regarding the Agreements and issues
regarding the WTO rules. If the Agreements are compared to
statutes in the American legal system and WTO rules are
compared to the common law, this author suggests that WTO
decision-makers would not go so far as to interpret the
Agreements, but rather only the WTO rules.
The American common law system of stare decisis includes
doctrines of vertical and horizontal stare decisis. The DSB should
require that future panels rely on Appellate Body decisions. 238 As
stated above, it is believed that there is no source of law that is as
important in WTO dispute settlement as the reported decisions of
prior dispute settlement panels, including WTO panels and reports
236 Id.

at *408-09.

237 Id. at

*409.

238 Bhala, supra note 5, at 853 (suggesting that the WTO Agreement and the DSU
should include Appellate Body reports as a source of international trade law).
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of the Appellate Body. 23 9 The international legal society should
admit that the holdings of the Appellate Body and panel reports
are sources of international law.
Because of the problems
discussed infra that plagued GATT, this author does not advocate
the use of prior GATT panel reports in a WTO dispute settlement
system of stare decisis. This author believes that unadopted
decision reports should not be relied upon because they have no
legal status in the GATT or WTO systems.2 4 °
IX. Conclusion
The international legal system is not fond of the common law
jurisprudence which mandates that courts operate under a strict
precedent or stare decisis rule of law. Stare decisis is a principle
common to Anglo-American jurisprudence and civil law systems.
Stare decisis is so attractive because it facilitates a system of
information transferred between judges, litigants and lawyers. 24 1 It
allows the participants to feel that they are more a part of the
decision-making process and more in control. This author does
not suggest that an American, common law way of thinking
should be imposed on WTO dispute settlement. However, this
author strongly believes that such a system would promote
increasing certainty and fairness, which would translate into
ensuring that the problems of the past GATT dispute settlement
system are not created again in the WTO dispute settlement
process.
Although the WTO dispute settlement flirts with stare decisis,
the reports and decisions are not binding. It is believed that a
system of binding precedent within the WTO dispute settlement
process will require a great deal of time to develop, as it is thought
that it would be difficult for the WTO to pass legislation that
would make international trade law dispute decisions binding
when the WTO itself is not binding. 42 Furthermore, the WTO
believes that its process of assigning persuasive effect to decisions

239 Palmeter & Mavroidis, supra note 170, at 400 (arguing that the text of WTO
Agreements is most important and after that, then prior dispute rulings).
240 Pierre Pescatore, Drafting and Analyzing Decisions on Dispute Settlement, in 1
HANDBOOK OF WTO/GATT DisPuTE SETTLEMENT PT. 2, 31 (1998).
241 Macey, supra note 152, at 93.
242 Feeney,

supra note 6, at 114.
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is a system that works. However, the WTO does not have to
follow this process and may cast it aside whenever it becomes
convenient. Such a system provides little in the way of concrete
stability and exposes the DSB to the ills that befell the GATT
dispute settlement process. If and/or until the system is changed,
it is hoped that WTO Panels and the Appellate Body will adhere to
the practice of considering previous decisions persuasive.
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